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232 abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the taxation of labour income in Croatia, Bel-
gium, Estonia, Germany and Slovakia. Having presented an outline of tax system 
rules, the paper shows the decomposition of the net average tax wedge for differ-
ent family types and different income levels based on the OECD methodology. The 
results show that all observed countries apply a progressive tax schedule, apart 
from Germany where taxation for higher gross wages is not progressive due to a 
cap on the SIC base. When it comes to a taxpayer earning an average gross wage, 
a Croatian single worker without children has the lowest tax burden, followed by 
Estonia, Slovakia, Germany and Belgium. However, as regards taxpayers earning 
400% of AGW, Estonia has the smallest tax wedge, followed by Slovakia, Ger-
many, Croatia and Belgium. Similar results are obtained by analyzing the tax 
wedge for couples with two children where one spouse is out of work. 
Keywords: taxation of labour income, progressivity, tax wedge, Belgium, Estonia, 
Germany, Slovakia, Croatia
1 IntRoDUctIon
The tax system of a country and, more specifically, the taxation of labour income 
are elements that are crucial for a country’s competitive advantage in the interna-
tional market, especially as regards the labour market. The subject of this paper, 
which is part of a wider research project focusing on the tax burden in Croatia and 
EU countries (see Urban, 2016), is the analysis of the tax burden on labour income 
in Croatia, Belgium, Estonia, Germany and Slovakia in 2013. 
In order to calculate tax burden indicators, a microsimulation model has been de-
veloped. The model is used to calculate SICs, PIT, and cash family benefits for 
hypothetical units (single workers and families) in each of the selected countries. 
By decomposing the net average tax wedge, one can see how different elements 
of the tax system influence the progressivity of the system as a whole and the tax 
burden imposed on different family types. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The introduction is followed by section 2, 
where the methodological hypotheses are outlined and the fundamental terms are 
defined. Section 3 outlines the results obtained from the calculation of the net 
average tax wedge and its elements. The results across selected countries are com-
pared in section 4, followed by the conclusion. The rules and characteristics of 
labour income taxation in the selected countries are outlined in the annex.
2 MethoDologY 
For the purpose of calculating the tax burden indicators and the variables neces-
sary for their computation, the methodology used in this paper is based on the 
OECD Taxing Wages publication (OECD, 2014). All the calculations refer to 
2013. Table 1 shows the eight basic hypothetical units for which tax burden indi-














































40 (2) 231-264 (2016)
233
In addition to the eight basic hypothetical units, two more hypothetical unit sets 
are investigated in this paper: the first comprises single workers without children 
earning between 50% and 400% of AGW, while the second includes couples with 
two children where one spouse is out of work and the other spouse’s wage is be-
tween 50% and 400% of AGW. One of the basic tenets of the model is that the 
hypothetical unit is assumed to have no income source other than labour income 
(gross wage) earned by adult members of the family. As shown in table 1, the 
gross wages of the hypothetical units are defined in relation to the average gross 
wage (AGW) in a given country. AGW is calculated in accordance with OECD 
(2014). Table 2 shows AGW values in selected countries.
Table 1
Characteristics of observed hypothetical units






1A-67-NC Single worker 0 2/3 x 100 –
1A-100-NC Single worker 0 100 –
1A-167-NC Single worker 0 5/3 x 100 –
1A-67-2C Single worker 2 2/3 x 100 –
2A-100/0-2C Couple 2 100 Out of work
2A-100/33-2C Couple 2 100 1/3 x 100
2A-100/67-2C Couple 2 100 2/3 x 100
2A-100/33-NC Couple 0 100 1/3 x 100
Note: The symbols stand for the following: AGW – average gross wage; A – adult; NC – no 
 children; 2C – 2 children. 
Source: OECD (2014).
Table 2
Annual average gross wages in selected countries, 2013
agw expressed in 
national currency
exchange rate agw (in eUR)
Croatia HRK 93,180 HRK/EUR = 7.5735 12,303
Belgium EUR 46,810 1 46,810
Estonia EUR 11,664 1 11,664
Germany EUR 45,170 1 45,170
Slovakia EUR 10,015 1 10,015
Source: (1) AGW – for Croatia: author’s calculation as per CBS (2016) and Urban (2016); for 
other countries: OECD (2014); (2) exchange rate for Croatia: CNB (2016).
PIT is paid to the central government, or to local government units in some coun-
tries. According to OECD (2014), total labour cost indicates the sum of gross wage, 
payroll taxes, and employer SICs. Total tax burden is defined as the sum of the 
payroll taxes, employee SICs, employer SICs, and PIT, minus cash family benefits. 
Net average tax wedge is the ratio of the total tax burden to the total labour cost. 
Employee tax burden is the sum of employee SICs and PIT minus cash family ben-
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234 It is important to note that employee and employer SICs refer exclusively to the 
payments made to the general government, as contributions paid to other funds are 
not included in the analysis. For instance, the Croatian pension system rests on 
two pillars: the 1st and the 2nd. Employee SICs paid into the 1st pillar are general 
government revenue, while the 2nd pillar contributions, though mandatory, are 
paid into private pension funds. Thus, the former is included in the tax burden 
calculation and the latter is not. For more information about this topic, see Urban 
(2016), Blažić and Trošelj (2012), OECD (2014, 2015).
The progressivity of the tax burden is reflected in the fact that the net average tax 
wedge (net average tax rate) increases with the gross wage. The progressivity of 
the system as a whole depends on the interaction of the system’s elements – SICs, 
PITs, and cash family benefits. Each of these elements comes with its own par-
ticularities. SICs are mostly levied at a fixed rate, which should mean that they do 
not impact average rates; however, caps on SIC bases can result in regressivity. 
PIT progressivity depends on the number and width of tax bands, as well as on the 
differences between marginal tax rates, especially the highest and the lowest. More-
over, the progressivity of PIT is also contingent on tax reliefs which can shrink the 
tax base (personal allowances) or the tax liability (tax credit). Tax base reductions 
are applied in Estonia, Slovakia and Croatia, while tax liability reductions are found 
in Belgium, Germany, and, again, Slovakia. Tax reliefs normally have a progressive 
effect, although in some cases they are implemented in such a manner that workers 
with higher incomes are entitled to comparatively higher tax reliefs.
Individuals and families can claim various cash family benefits. Such benefits are 
usually targeted at low-income households; however, some benefits are not in-
come tested and are distributed to households solely depending on the number of 
children. The benefits, however, have a progressive effect in both cases since they 
reduce the relative tax burden.
Tax burden decomposition presented in section 3 will illustrate how different ele-
ments of the tax system applied to different hypothetical units across the selected 
countries influence its progressivity.
3 tax bURDen InDIcatoRs: coUntRY oVeRVIew
3.1 cRoatIa
The Croatian labour income taxation system is described in annex A1. 
Figure 1 shows the net average tax wedge and its decomposition for one of the 
basic hypothetical units – single workers. The share of contributions in the labour 
cost is identical at all gross wage levels due to a single contribution rate and the 
non-existence of a cap on the SIC base.1 Combined, employer and employee SICs 
1 The cap on the base applies only on contributions paid to the 1st pension insurance pillar, but not unless 600% 
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235make up 26.2% of the total labour cost. Due to a relatively high personal allow-
ance, a single worker with two children earning a gross wage of 67% of AGW 
(1A-67-2C) does not have to pay PIT. The progressivity of PIT becomes evident 
when its share in the tax wedge for hypothetical units 1A-67-NC, 1A-100-NC and 
1A-167-NC is compared.
Figure 1
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units: single workers 
(Croatia, 2013), in %
Note: “Personal income taxes” comprises PIT and local government surtax.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 2
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units: couples 
(Croatia, 2013), in %
Note: “Personal income taxes” comprises PIT and local government surtax.
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236 Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of the net average tax wedge for basic hy-
pothetical units – couples. SICs represent the same shares in the total labour cost 
as in the case of single workers. PIT share varies depending on the income level 
and the allowance for dependent children, meaning that it is significantly lower for 
couples with two children earning a total gross wage of 133% of AGW (2A-100/33-
2C) than for families without children earning the same income (2A-100/33-NC). 
The reason for this is the fact that the former family can claim personal allowance 
for children.
Figure 3 illustrates the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net 
average tax rate for a hypothetical single worker without children earning a gross 
wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW. SICs constitute a prevailing share of 
the tax wedge, while the share of PIT in the total labour cost grows proportionally 
to income. PIT is progressive due to the fact that personal allowance is fixed while 
the tax schedule is progressive. Net average tax rates are between 18.1% for the 
lowest income levels and 36.5% for the highest.
Figure 3
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for single workers without children 
earning a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW (Croatia), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 4 shows the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net aver-
age tax rate for a hypothetical couple with two children, where one of the spouses 
is out of work and the other earns between 50% and 250% of AGW. PIT equals 0 
if the gross wage is less or equal to 100% of AGW, but its share becomes positive 
and increases as gross wages exceed 100% of AGW. The share of SICs in the total 
labour cost is a constant. The tax wedge may be reduced in the case of families 
with a gross wage below 110% of AGW, as they are entitled to cash benefits (in 
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237Figure 4
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for a couple with two children, where 
one spouse is out of work and the other spouse earns a gross wage of between 
50% and 250% of AGW (Croatia), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
3.2 belgIUM
A description of Belgium’s labour income taxation system can be found in annex A2.
Figure 5
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units with one 
adult (Belgium, 2013), in %
Note: “Personal income taxes” comprises PIT and local government surtax. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 5 shows the net average tax wedge and its decomposition into employee 
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238 workers. In the case of single workers, the share of contributions in the total la-
bour cost is the same at all income levels due to a fixed SIC amount, with differ-
ences in the total tax burden arising from PIT. The applicable cash benefits for 
families with children are not income-related. A single worker with two children 
earning a gross wage of 67% of AGW (1A-67-2C) is entitled to a cash benefit that 
leads to a reduction of the tax burden. Therefore, the net average tax wedge of the 
above worker is 36.5%. The tax wedge of single workers without children earning 
a gross wage of 167% of AGW (1A-167-NC) is 60.9%. In view of that, it can be 
said that the taxation of labour income for single workers without children is pro-
gressive due to the effect of PIT.
Figure 6 illustrates net average tax wedge decomposition for basic hypothetical 
units – couples. The differences in the tax wedge are partially due to cash benefits 
that families with children are entitled to. Unlike single workers, who pay a fixed 
SIC amount, SIC shares for couples vary due to the fact that they, i.e. those spo-
uses earning a gross wage of 33% of AGW and therefore classified as low-income 
workers, are entitled to a reduction of SIC payments.
Figure 6
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units: couples 
(Belgium, 2013), in %
Note: “Personal income taxes” comprises PIT and local government surtax.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 7 shows the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net aver-
age tax rate for a hypothetical single worker without children earning a gross 
wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW. The tax wedge in the observed gross 
wage range is between 41.8% and 63.4%. Employer SICs (approximately 20%) 
and employee SICs account for the majority of the burden. When it comes to em-
ployee SICs, it is noticeable that the SIC share for those earning gross wages of 
50% to 60% of AGW is lower due to the taxpayers’ right to a reduction of em-
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239cost for gross wages of 50% of AGW, and 28% for gross wages of 250% of AGW, 
meaning that PIT accounts for taxation progressivity in the case of single workers.
Figure 7
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for single workers without children 
earning a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW (Belgium, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 8
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for a couple with two children, where 
one spouse is out of work, while the other earns a gross wage of between 50% and 
250% of AGW (Belgium, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 8 illustrates the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net 














































40 (2) 231-264 (2016)
240 out of work while the other earns a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of 
AGW. Cash benefits result in the reduction of the total tax wedge in the range 
between 15.7%, for gross wages amounting to 50% of AGW, and 57.1%, for gross 
wages amounting to 250% of AGW. Cash benefits effectively increase the pro-
gressivity of the tax system. Once again, a reduction of SICs for low-income 
workers leads to an “anomaly” in SIC payments. PIT is progressive; its share in 
the total labour cost at the lowest observed income level is 1.0%, while its share 
at the highest observed income level is 24.7%. The net average tax rate is between 
-6% for the lowest and 44% for the highest income level.
3.3 estonIa
For a description of Estonia’s labour income taxation system, see annex A3.
Figure 9 shows the net average tax wedge and its decomposition for basic hypo-
thetical units – single workers. The SIC share in the total labour cost is constant. 
The tax share in the total labour cost is lower for families with two children due to 
the fact that they are entitled to higher tax reliefs. The difference in the share of 
PIT in the total labour cost is due to lump-sum tax reliefs, the relative relevance of 
which decreases as the income grows. This means that the tax liability of taxpay-
ers with higher incomes is relatively higher. The tax wedge for the hypothetical 
unit 1A-67-2C is lower than that for single workers without children due to the 
former’s right to claim cash family benefits.
Figure 9
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units:  
single workers (Estonia, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 10 illustrates the decomposition of the net average tax wedge for basic 
hypothetical units – couples. The SIC rate is fixed. The differences in the PIT 
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241differences in income levels. Families with children are entitled to higher tax re-
liefs, resulting in the reduction of the tax base. Tax reliefs are lump sum, which 
represents a relative advantage for low-income families. Since Estonia has a sin-
gle-rate PIT schedule, the mild progressivity of the PIT is the result of tax reliefs. 
The progressivity of the system is partially due to cash family benefits.
Figure 10
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units: couples 
(Estonia, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
The decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net average tax rate for a 
hypothetical single worker without children earning a gross wage of between 50% 
and 250% of AGW is shown in figure 11. The tax wedge for gross wages amount-
ing to 50% of AGW is 37.6%, and the wedge for the highest observed gross wage 
(250% of AGW) is 41.3%. Employer SICs account for the majority of the tax 
wedge, 25.4% of the total labour cost. Employee SICs account for approximately 
1.5% of the total labour cost, while the PIT share is between 10.7% and 14.4% of 
the total labour cost. The degree of progressivity is very small due to a lump-sum 
basic tax allowance. The net average tax rate is between 16.4% and 21.3%.
Figure 12 illustrates the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net 
average tax rate for a hypothetical couple with two children with one spouse out 
of work and the other earning a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW. 
As is the case with single workers, the SIC share is fixed due to the fact that the 
SIC rate is proportional and that there is no cap on the tax base. The PIT share in 
the tax wedge grows as the gross wage increases due fixed tax reliefs. The tax 
wedge is between 22.4% and 38.2%. Cash family benefits are lump sum, making 
the system more progressive since their impact on the total labour cost is more 
pronounced at the lower income interval. The net average tax rate is between -4% 
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242 sivity of the system in this case is therefore more pronounced than in the case 
of single workers, owing to the relatively high tax allowances and cash family 
benefits.
Figure 11
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for single workers without children 
earning a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW (Estonia, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 12
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for couples with two children where one 
spouse is out of work and the other spouse earns a gross wage of between 50% 
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2433.4 geRManYThe German labour income taxation system is described in annex A4.
Figure 13 shows the net average tax wedge and its decomposition for basic hypo-
thetical units – single workers. The German system is particular for its relatively 
low cap on the maximum SIC base, due to which hypothetical unit 1A-167-NC’s 
SIC share in the tax wedge is lower than that of units earning a lower gross wage, 
1A-67-NC and 1A-100-NC. However, the progressive PIT “compensates” for the 
above, making the system as a whole progressive. Due to tax reliefs for children, 
the PIT for a single worker with two children earning a gross wage of 67% of 
AGW (1A-67-2C) in fact has a negative effect on the tax wedge. 
Figure 13
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units:  
single workers (Germany, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 14 shows the decomposition of the net average tax wedge for basic hypo-
thetical units – couples. In the case of the observed couples, SIC shares in the total 
labour cost are comparable due to the rule that the income of spouses assessed 
jointly is divided in two, resulting in neither of those two amounts exceeding the 
threshold above which SICs turn constant (150% of average gross income). PIT 
share in the total labour cost is lowest for the couple 2A-100/0-2C (33.8%) whose 
total gross wage is lower than that earned by couples 2A-100/33-2C and 2A-100/ 
67-2C. Couple 2A-100/33-NC has the highest tax wedge (45.1%), exceeding by 6.5 
percentage points the tax wedge of a couple earning the same gross wage and having 
two children (2A-100/33-2C); this difference is the result of tax reliefs for children.
The decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net average tax rate for a 
hypothetical single worker without children earning a gross wage of between 50% 
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244 wedge at lower gross wage levels. At higher income levels the SIC share starts to 
decline due to a SIC base ceiling, and PIT comprises the greater part of the wedge. 
PIT share in the total labour cost at the highest observed gross wage level is 30%. 
Unlike in other observed countries, the tax wedge in Germany does not increase 
monotonically; it reaches its maximum at wages amounting to 150% of AGW and 
starts declining. This is a consequence of a SIC base ceiling, which makes the tax 
system regressive: above this ceiling, PIT cannot compensate for the regression 
effect caused by SICs. The net average tax rate is between 30.9% and 43.9%.
Figure 14
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units: couples 
(Germany, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 15
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for single workers without children 
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245Figure 16 shows the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net aver-
age tax rate for hypothetical couples with two children where one spouse is out of 
work, and the other spouse earns a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of 
AGW. The net average tax rate is between 1.7% and 29.2%. Again, the SIC share 
in the total labour cost decreases, rendering the taxation system regressive. PIT is 
progressive, i.e. its share in the labour cost increases proportionally to income. At 
low income levels, PIT is negative due to the fact that tax the credit for children 
exceeds the initial tax amount.
Figure 16
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for couples with two children where one 
spouse is out of work, and the other spouse earns a gross wage of between 50% 
and 250% of AGW (Germany, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
3.5 sloVaKIa
The Slovak labour income taxation system is described in annex A5.
Figure 17 shows the net average tax wedge and its decomposition for basic hypo-
thetical units – single workers. The SIC share in the total labour cost is constant 
since there is no SIC base ceiling, meaning that SICs increase proportionally to the 
labour cost. Tax becomes negative for single workers with two children (1A-
67-2C) due to the fact that they are entitled to a tax credit for children. PIT is not 
progressive in itself since the threshold of the second tax band is significantly high-
er than the income taken into account in this analysis. However, it becomes pro-
gressive due to personal tax allowances which are constant in relation to income.
Figure 18 illustrates the decomposition of the net average tax wedge for basic 
hypothetical units – couples. The SIC share in the total labour cost is constant. The 
PIT share is negative for unit 2A-100/0-2C due to tax credits for children. Cash 
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246 Figure 17
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units:  
single workers (Slovakia, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 18
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for basic hypothetical units: couples 
(Slovakia, 2013), in %
2A-100/0-2C 2A-100/33-2C 2A-100/67-2C 2A-100/33-NC
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 19 shows the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net aver-
age tax rate for a hypothetical single worker without children with a gross wage of 
between 50% and 250% of AGW. The labour income taxation system is progres-
sive, and the SIC share is constant. The taxable income amount does not exceed 
the threshold of the second tax band to which a 25% tax rate is applied, resulting 
in a 19% rate being applied to the entire base amount. PIT is still progressive due 
to tax credits: the absolute amount of the basic tax credit is standard and it declines 
after the income reaches a certain level, increasing the progressivity of the system. 
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247Figure 19
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for single workers without children 
earning a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW (Slovakia, 2013), in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 20 illustrates the decomposition of the net average tax wedge and the net 
average tax rate for a hypothetical couple with two children where one spouse is 
out of work and the other earns a gross wage of between 50% and 250% of AGW. 
The SIC share in the labour cost is constant. The line representing the tax wedge 
shows that the system is progressive due to constant tax allowance amounts and 
cash family benefits as well.
Figure 20
Decomposition of net average tax wedge for a couple with two children where one 
spouse is out of work and the other earns a gross wage of between 50% and 250% 
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248 4  coMPaRIson of wage taxatIon acRoss obseRVeD coUntRIes
Having analysed the tax systems of each of the countries separately, this section 
compares the tax burden for different family types and different gross wages 
across all observed countries. 
Figure 21 shows the comparison of the net average tax wedge for single workers 
without children earning a gross wage of 100% of AGW (1A-100-NC) and a cou-
ple with two children, where only one spouse is employed and earns a gross wage 
of 100% of AGW (2A-100/0-2C).
The tax wedge for both hypothetical units is lowest in Croatia and highest in Bel-
gium. In all countries under consideration, single workers are in a less favourable 
position than families with children. The tax wedge of Belgian single workers 
reaches 55.8% of the total labour cost. The reason for this are high tax rates and 
relatively narrow tax bands, due to which even single workers earning average 
gross wages cross the upper band threshold and pay a high 50% tax on a part of 
their tax base.
Figure 21
Comparison of net average tax wedge for hypothetical units 1A-100-NC and 
2A-100/0-2C, in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 22 shows the share of the tax burden in the total labour cost for single 
workers without children earning a gross wage of 167% of AGW (1A-167-NC) 
and a couple with two children whose total gross wage also amounts to 167% of 
AGW, but is distributed so that one of the spouses earns 100%, and the other 
spouse 67% of AGW (2A-100/67-2C).
For both hypothetical units the tax wedge is the highest in Belgium and the lowest 
in Croatia. There are similarities to be found in the tax burden levels in Croatia, 
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249threshold of the higher tax band to which a tax rate of 25% is applied is very high. 
Croatia has several tax bands, but relatively low tax rates (12% and 25%) are ap-
plied to this income level. Unlike Croatian, Estonian, and Slovak tax rates, Ger-
man and Belgian tax rates are higher, which accounts for the noticeable differ-
ences among the countries. As noted above, in Belgium even taxpayers earning an 
average income pertain to the highest tax band to which a 50% tax rate is applied.
The tax wedge of hypothetical units with children (2A-100/67-2C) in all countries 
is lower than the tax wedge of hypothetical units without children (1A-167-NC). 
The spread between these two units is widest in Belgium (12%) and narrowest in 
Estonia (4.5%).
Figure 22
Comparison of the net average tax wedge for hypothetical units 1A-167-NC and 
2A-100/67-2C, in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 23 shows the correlation between the tax wedge and the gross wage of 
single workers without children across all five observed countries for gross wages 
between 50% and 400% of AGW.
The country that stands out again is Belgium, where the tax wedge for the highest 
observed gross wage is 65%. When their gross wage reaches approximately 200% 
of AGW, taxpayers in Croatia cross the threshold and enter the highest tax band, 
where a tax rate of 40% is applied to a part of their tax base, while local govern-
ment surtax further heightens the marginal tax rate, resulting in the tax wedge in 
Croatia being higher than that in Estonia, Slovakia and Germany at wages amount-
ing to 190%, 230%, and 330% of AGW. Thus, when it comes to relatively high 
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250 Figure 23
Comparison of net average tax wedge for single workers without children earning 
a gross wage of between 50% and 400% of AGW, in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 24 shows the correlation of the tax wedge and the gross wage for hypo-
thetical couples with two children, where one spouse is out of work and the other 
earns 50% to 400% of AGW. Other than in the case of low gross wages, the tax 
wedge is the highest in Belgium. The progressive taxation of the labour income is 
characteristic for all countries apart from Germany (within a certain income inter-
val). Once again, it is evident that the tax wedge at relatively high income levels 
in Croatia is the highest of all the observed countries apart from Belgium.
Figure 24
Comparison of the net average tax wedge for couples with two children where one 
spouse is out of work and the other earns a gross wage of between 50% and 400% 
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251Figure 25 shows the net average tax rate for single workers without children in all 
observed countries. The rate is the highest in Belgium, except for low-income 
units. Germany comes second, and Croatian rates come close to Germany’s at 
high income levels. The highest average tax rate (in Belgium) is twice the lowest 
average tax rate (in Estonia). 
Figure 25
Comparison of the net average tax rate for single workers without children 
earning a gross wage of between 50% and 400% of AGW, in %
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 26
Comparison of net average tax rate for couples with two children where one 
spouse is out of work and the other earns a gross wage of between 50% and 400% 
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252 The average tax rate for a hypothetical couple with two children where one spouse 
is out of work and the other earns a gross wage of between 50% and 400% of 
AGW is shown in figure 26. The line representing Croatia is broken as a conse-
quence of child benefit bands.2 In Croatia, the tax rate for above-average wages 
continues to grow, while the growth of the average tax rate in Germany slows 
down at the point where the benefits become constant. The net average tax rate is 
the highest in Belgium for all income levels except the lowest. The position of the 
taxpayers in Slovakia and Estonia is the most favourable. In some countries, the 
net average tax rate is negative due to cash benefits that exceed taxes and SIC 
amounts. 
5 conclUsIon
The research subject of this paper is the tax burden on labour income in five EU 
countries: Croatia, Belgium, Estonia, Germany and Slovakia. The comparison of 
net average tax wedges for single workers has shown that the tax wedge for single 
workers without children earning an average gross wage is the lowest in Croatia; 
however, at high gross wage levels (350% of AGW and more), the tax wedge in 
Croatia was second only to the tax wedge in Belgium. Similar results are obtained 
when comparisons are made among the tax wedges of couples with two children, 
where only one of the spouses is employed.
Tax progressivity should, in theory, be a means of distributing the tax liability in 
such a manner that the heaviest burden is borne by those with the highest income, 
with the consequences reflected in a more balanced income structure after the ap-
plication of taxes and cash benefits. This paper presents conclusions regarding 
income tax progressivity in countries under observation. The efficiency of those 
systems as to the distribution of tax liabilities with the end of creating a balanced 
income structure is an interesting and complex issue which merits further, detailed 
research.














































40 (2) 231-264 (2016)
253RefeRences
1. Blažić, H. and Trošelj, I., 2012. Međunarodna usporedba poreznog opterećenja 
radne snage: utjecaj nove metodologije na položaj Hrvatske. In: L. Božina, M. 
Gonan-Božac and D. Učkar, eds. Financije i menadžment u globalnoj ekono-
miji. Pula: Sveučilište Jurja Dobrile u Puli, Odjel za ekonomiju i turizam, 
pp. 185-204.
2. CBS, 2016. Statistika u nizu: Zaposlenost i plaće (Statistics in line: Employ-
ment and wages). [online] Available at: <http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/Pokaza-
telji/MSI ZAPOSLENOST I PLACE.xlsx>.
3. Child Benefits Act (Zakon o doplatku za djecu), NN 94/01, 138/06, 107/07, 
37/08, 61/11, 112/12, 82/15. [online] Available at: <http://www.zakon.
hr/z/475/zakon-o-doplatku-za-djecu>. 
4. CNB, 2016. CNB midpoint exchange rate. [online] Available at: <http://www.
hnb.hr/en/statistics/statistical-data/central-bank-cnb/cnb-midpoint-exchange-
rate>.
5. Čok, M. [et al.], 2013. Taxation of wages in the Alps-Adriatic region. Finan-
cial Theory and Practice, 37(3), pp. 259-277. doi: 10.3326/fintp.37.3.2 
6. Contributions Act (Zakon o doprinosima), NN 84/08, 152/08, 94/09, 18/11, 
22/12, 144/12, 148/13, 41/14 and 143/14. Available at: <http://www.zakon.
hr/z/365/Zakon-o-doprinosima>.
7. Ministry of Finance, 2015. Oporezivanje primitaka iz radnog odnosa (plaće). 
[online] Available at: <http://www.porezna-uprava.hr/HR_publikacije/Priruc-
nici_brosure/Place_161nova.pdf >.
8. OECD, 2014. Taxing Wages 2014. Paris: OECD.
9. Urban, I., 2014. Supports for households with children. Newsletter, No. 88. 
doi: 10.3326/nle.2014.88 
10. Urban, I., 2016. Tax wedge on labour income in Croatia and the European Union. 














































40 (2) 231-264 (2016)
254 annex
taxatIon of laboUR IncoMe In selecteD coUntRIes
a1. croatia
There are three types of SICs payable by employers, their rate in 2013 having 
amounted to a total of 15.2% (table A1). Croatian employees set aside 20% of 
their gross wage amounts for contributions paid into two pension insurance pil-
lars: the intergenerational solidarity pension pillar payments (the so-called 1st pil-
lar) are disbursed to the central government, while the individual capital savings-
based pension pillar payments go to private pension funds (the 2nd pillar).3 A cap 
on the SIC base exists only in the case of 1st pillar contributions and was set at 
HRK 571,608 per year in 2013.
Table a1
SIC rates (Croatia, 2013)
contribution employee rate
(% of gross wage)
employer
(% of gross wage)
1st pillar pension insurance contributions 15.0 –
2nd pillar pension insurance contributions 5.0 –
Health insurance contributions – 13.0
Work-related injury contributions – 0.5
Employment contributions – 1.7
Total 20.0 15.2
Source: Contributions Act.
Taxable personal income in Croatia includes income from employment (wage and 
pension), income from self-employment, income from property and property 
rights, income from capital, income from insurance, and other receipts (according 
to the Personal Income Tax Act).
Employee SICs paid to either of the two pension insurance pillars are not subject 
to tax. All taxpayers are entitled to a basic personal allowance, plus additional 
personal allowances for dependent children and adult family members (table A2). 
Spouses’ incomes are taxed separately. If both spouses earn an income and sup-
port immediate family members, one of two options can be applied: the additional 
personal allowance for children can be split in two or an alternative distribution 
method can be arranged. This paper assumes that the personal allowance is used 
fully by the spouse earning the higher income.
Three tax bands (table A3) and a local government surtax rate of between 0% and 
18% were applied in Croatia in 2013. This paper assumes a local government 
surtax rate of 12%.
3 In accordance with the Taxing Wages methodology, 2nd pension insurance pillar contributions are not paid 
to the general government and are therefore not taken into account in the calculation of tax burden indicators. 
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255Table a2
Personal allowance factors and annual amounts (Croatia, 2013)
Personal allowance factor annual amount (in hRK)
Basic personal allowance 1.00 26,400
Adult dependent 0.50 13,200
First child 0.50 13,200
Second child 0.70 18,480
Third child 1.00 26,400
Fourth child 1.40 36,960
Fifth child 1.90 50,160
Disability 0.30  7,920
Total disability 1.00 26,400
Note: Taxpayers resident in areas of special state concern (cities and municipalities) are entitled 
to higher personal allowance amounts. For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that the tax-
payers are not residents of such areas.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2013).
Table a3
Tax bands and marginal rates (Croatia, 2013)
annual tax base Rate (in %)
Up to HRK 26,400 12
From HRK 26,400 to HRK 105,600 25
Over HRK 105,600 40
Source: Ministry of Finance (2013).
The child benefit is an income-tested cash benefit received by families with chil-
dren, and their amount depends on the net income (gross income minus pension 
insurance SICs, tax, and local government surtax) per household member. Income 
bands and amounts are shown in table A4.
Table a4
Child benefit schedule (Croatia, 2013)
net income per family member 
(annually, in hRK)
Child benefit per child
(annually, in hRK)
0 – 6,518 3,592
6,518 – 13,434 2,993
13,434 – 19,956 2,395
>19,956 0
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256 a2. belgium
Spouses are taxed separately. If one spouse’s income is below 30% of joint in-
come, a certain amount can be added to the income of that spouse, this amount 
being capped at 30% of joint net income minus the income of the spouse to which 
the amount is transferred. The ceiling for the above amount is EUR 10,090. 
Spouses file jointly.
Employee SICs amount to 13.07% of the gross wage (table A5). Employees are 
entitled to a reduction of SICs, depending on their gross wage. The 2013 reduction 
schedule varied, and this paper uses a weighted arithmetic mean which is pre-
sented in table A6. 
Table a5
Employee SICs as a percentage of gross wage (Belgium, 2013)
employee sIcs Rate (in %)
Employment contributions  0.87
Work-related injury insurance  1.15
Health insurance  3.55




Weighted arithmetic mean: employee SIC reduction schedule (in EUR)  
(Belgium, 2013)
annual gross wage (s) sIc reduction
 0 < S < 18,021.84 2,181
18,021.84 < S < 28,624.92 Min (2,181, (2,181 – 0.2057 * (S – 18,021.84)))
28,624.92 < S 0
Source: OECD (2014).
Employees are entitled to a standard tax deduction for work-related expenses, the 
schedule of which is shown in table A7.
Table a7
Tax deduction for work-related expenses as a percentage of gross income minus 
employee SICs (Belgium, 2013)
gross income – sIcs = b (in eUR) Rate (in %)
 B < 5,650 28.7
 5,650 < B < 11,220 10
11,220 < B < 18,670  5
18,670 < B  3
Source: OECD (2014).
All employees are liable for a special SIC which depends on the wage and is ap-
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257Table a8
Special SIC schedule (Belgium, 2013)
taxable income  
(in eUR)
amount due  
on the lower limit  
(in eUR)
% of taxable  
income minus lower  
limit amount
0 – 18,592.02 0 0
18,592.02 – 21,070.96 0 9
21,070.96 – 60,161.85 223.10 1.30
60,161.85 and above 731.29 0
Source: OECD (2014).
Total employer SICs, shown in table A9, amount to 34.67% of the gross wage. 
Employers can benefit from a 1% reduction in the total SIC amount. This deduc-
tion does not affect the liability of the employee but only reduces the amount of 
employer SICs to 33.67% of the total wage.
Table a9
Employer SICs on employee gross wage (Belgium, 2013)
contribution Percentage of gross wage
Employment  3.16
Health insurance indemnities  2.35
Health insurance  3.80
Placement services  0.05
Family allowances  7.00
Pension insurance  8.86
Child care  0.05
Work-related illnesses  1.01
Work-related injury  0.32
Education leave  0.05
Business closure  0.43
Wage restraint  7.59
Total 34.67
Source: OECD (2014).
The reduction schedule varied in the course of 2013. The calculations in this paper 
are based on the weighted arithmetic mean presented in table A10. 
Table a10
Weighted arithmetic mean: employer SIC reduction schedule (in EUR)  
(Belgium, 2013)
annual gross income (s) fixed amount Variable amount
0 – 22,627.9 1,757.50 0.162 * (22,627.79 – S)
22,627.9 – 53,314.20 1,757.50 0
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258 Tax base reductions can be applied to employee SICs (table A7) and business ex-
penses (table A9). The tax rate applied to the resulting taxable income depends on 
the tax band. Tax bands and tax rates are shown in table A11.
Table a11
Tax bands and marginal tax rates (Belgium, 2013)
taxable income (in eUR) Marginal rate (in %)
0 – 8,590 25
8,590 – 12,220 30
12,220 – 20,370 40
20,370 – 37,330 45
37,330 and above 50
Source: OECD (2014).
Tax credits can be applied on the following bases:
(a)  Taxable income, S. Conditions and amounts are shown in table A12.
(b)  Dependent child (table A13).
(c)  Special tax credits. Only the tax credit for single parents applies and 
amounts to EUR 1,490.
Table a12
Tax exemption base (in EUR) (Belgium, 2013)
taxable income (s) fixed amount Variable amount
0 – 25,990 7,270 0
25,990 – 26,270 6,990 26,270 – S
26,270 and above 6,990 0
Source: OECD (2014).
Table a13
Dependent child tax credit base (Belgium, 2013)






Local taxes in Belgium are levied as a percentage of the PIT liability before the 
deduction of special tax credits for low-income earners or for energy-saving ex-
penses. Local surtax rates are determined by municipalities, and no ceiling ap-
plies. The average rate for Belgium is deemed to be 7.4%.
Universal cash benefits are granted to workers with children. For the purpose of 
this paper, it is assumed that the employee has either two or no children. In the 
case of taxpayers with two children, it is assumed that one is between seven and 
ten, and the other between eleven and twelve years old. Total amounts of cash 
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259a3. estonia
The tax unit in Estonia is the family. Employees and employers pay SICs as shown 
in table A14. The total SIC amount payable by the employee is 2% of the gross 
wage, while the total SIC amount payable by the employer is 34% of the gross 
wage; evidently, a larger SIC burden falls on the employer. 
Table a14
SIC schedule (Estonia, 2013)
contribution employee  
(% of gross wage)
employer  
(% of gross wage)
Employment 2  1
Health insurance 0 13
Pension insurance 0 20
Source: OECD (2014).
The basic tax allowance is EUR 1,728. A tax allowance is granted for employment 
contributions, and there are special tax allowances for dependent children (table 
A15). 
Table a15
Tax reliefs for dependent children (Estonia, 2013)






Moreover, there are non-standard tax reliefs such as private pension fund contri-
butions, insurance, housing loan interests, and education costs. Non-standard tax 
reliefs are not taken into account in the models used in this paper; it is, however, 
important to note that these non-standard tax reliefs have an effect in reality.
The PIT rate is 21%, and no regional or local taxes are applied. Taxpayers are 
entitled to a child benefit for children up to 16 years of age or up to 19 years of age 
if they are still receiving an education. These payments are non-taxable. The cash 
benefit schedule is shown in table A16.
Table a16
Cash benefits: child benefits (Estonia, 2013)
Benefit type annual amount (in eUR)
Child benefit (up to the age of 16 or 19)
First and second child 230.16
Third child and any subsequent children 690.48
Child of a single parent 230.16
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260 a4. germany
Even though spouses can file their taxes separately, this paper assumes that they 
file jointly. 
SICs in Germany are paid by both employees and employers. SIC payment sched-
ule is shown in table A17.
Table a17
SIC liability schedule (Germany, 2013)
contribution employee  
(% of gross wage)
employer  
(% of gross wage)
Employment 1.50 1.50
Sick leave 8.20 7.30
Pension insurance 9.45 9.45
Long-term care (no children) 1.275 1.025
Long-term care (at least one child) 1.025 1.025
Source: OECD (2014).
Tax reliefs for SICs and other expenses incurred in provision for the future (such 
as life insurance) are calculated as follows:
1)  All contributions made to pension funds (i.e. both employee’s and employer’s 
contributions) are added up.
2) The resulting amount is limited to EUR 20,000.
3)  A certain percentage is applied on the resulting amount: in 2005 this per-
centage was 60% and was increased by 2% in each subsequent year to reach 
76% in 2013, i.e. 100% in 2025.
4)  Non-taxable employer SICs are deducted from the resulting amount, and 
this amount constitutes the tax relief.
Tax reliefs can include employee SICs for health insurance, which are presumed 
to constitute 96% of total payments for health care, and mandatory long-term care 
insurance. Employment contributions and other contributions can also constitute 
tax reliefs up to the EUR 1,900 ceiling for single workers and EUR 3,800 for 
couples. There are no basic allowances in the German tax system.
Work-related expenses up to EUR 1,000 are deductible. If the taxpayer can prove 
that their expenses exceed the aforementioned lump-sum, the entire amount can 
be deducted. A lump-sum allowance of EUR 36 for single workers or EUR 72 for 
couples is deductible as a tax accountancy expense.
Tax bands are based on the following formulas:
X = taxable income
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261  (A1)
  (A2)
T = 0, for X ≤ 8130
T = (933.70Y + 1,400)Y, for 8,131 ≤ X ≤ 13,469
T = (228.74Z + 2,397)Z + 1,014, for 13,470 ≤ X ≤ 52,881
T = 0.42X – 81,96, for 52,882 ≤ X ≤ 25,0730
T = 0.45X – 15,718, for 250,731 ≤ X.
These formulas are used to calculate the income tax liability for single workers. 
The tax liability for couples who file jointly is computed by calculating PIT for ½ 
of joint taxable income, then doubling the resulting amount to obtain the tax liabil-
ity for both spouses.
Taxpayers are also liable to pay so-called solidarity surcharge amounting to 5.5% 
of the PIT liability. An exemption of EUR 972 for single workers and EUR 1,944 
for couples is applied. If the PIT liability exceeds the exemption amount, the soli-
darity surcharge shall be charged at the rate of 20% of the difference between the 
tax liability and the exemption limit. Tax reliefs for children are taken into account 
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262 a5. slovakia
The tax unit in Slovakia is the individual.
Employer SICs amounting to 13.4% of the gross wage constitute a tax relief. Em-
ployee SICs are shown in table A18. Tax relief amounts are limited to 5*AWt-2, 
where AWt-2 is the average wage earned two years before. This amount for 2011 
was EUR 9,432 per year. 
Table a18
Employee SIC rates (Slovakia, 2013)







Employer SICs amount to 35.2% of the gross wage. Starting from 2005, a part of 
these contributions is paid into a private pension fund. Since these payments are 
not made to government schemes, they shall not be taken into account when cal-
culating the average PIT rate. Therefore, total employer SICs for the purpose of 
this paper are 31.2% of the gross wage in 2013. Employer SICs are shown in table 
A19.
Table a19
Employer SIC rates (Slovakia, 2013)
contribution Rate (% of gross wage)
Health insurance 10








The schedule of the income-tested non-standard employee tax credit (ETC), intro-
duced in 2009, is shown in table A20. For the purpose of this research, only fami-
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263Table a20
ETC Schedule (Slovakia, 2013)
annual income P (in eUR) etc (in eUR)
6 * 337.7 < P < 12 * 337.7 0.19 * (3,735.94 – 3,509.76)
P > 12 * 337.7 0.19 * max(3,735.94 – tax base, 0)
Source: OECD (2014).
The basic tax allowance is subject to the criteria shown in table A21.
Table a21
Tax allowance (Slovakia, 2013)
Income levels tax relief (in eUR)
Gross income < 19,458 19.2 * 3,735.94
19,458 < gross income 44.2 * 3,735.94 – 0.25 * (gross income – SICs)
gross income – SICs > 34,401 0
Source: OECD (2014).
In 2013 two tax bands were introduced, as shown in table A22. There are no local 
taxes. 
Table a22
Tax bands and marginal rates (Slovakia, 2013)
annual taxable income (in eUR) Rate (in %)
0 – 34,401.74 19
34,401.74 and above 25
Source: OECD (2014).
The 2013 annual tax credit for children was set at EUR 254.64 for each child. If 
the tax liability goes into the negative, and the taxpayer’s earnings are at least 
EUR 2,026.2 per year, this amount will be paid to the taxpayer. Only one spouse 
can claim this tax relief. For the purposes of this paper, the tax relief is claimed by 
the spouse earning the higher income. Table A23 shows the tax credit schedule.
Table a23
Tax credit schedule (Slovakia, 2013)






Cash benefits apply and amount to EUR 23.10 for each child. Some families are 
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264 below the minimum living standard determined for the particular family type, 
they are entitled to monthly social benefits according to the schedule shown in 
table A25. Minimum living standard criteria are shown in table A24.
Table a24
Minimum living standard amounts (in EUR) (Slovakia, 2013)
 Until June 30th, 2013  since July 1st, 2013
First adult 194.58 198.09
Second adult 135.74 138.19
Child   88.82   90.42
Source: OECD (2014).
Table a25
Social benefit schedule (Slovakia, 2013)
family type Monthly amount (in eUR)
Single worker without children  60.50
Single worker with one to four children 115.10
Couple with one to four children 157.60
Couple without children 105.20
Single worker with more than four 
children 168.20
Couple with more than four children 212.30
Source: OECD (2014).
